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Evolution of Aviation Terrorism – El Al Israeli Airlines, Case
Study
Abstract
The research problem of this article is the process of evolution of aviation terrorism over
the years as illustrated by attacks against El Al airlines, with special reference to the
research perspective of the security system. The author embarks on verifying the
hypothesis that aviation terrorism is changing phenomenon which has been accompanied
over the years by increasingly brutal methods and effects of the attacks, transforming
aviation terrorism from a medium of communication to a tool for causing maximum
damage. Employing the genealogical method, the author analysed 52 terrorist attacks from
the years 1968 to 2012, whereby he attempted to answer the research question of "How
has the phenomenon of aviation terrorism evolved over the years?"
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Introduction
The term aviation terrorism stems from the sectoral division of
terrorism and is categorised among the most serious threats to civil air
transport. The research problem of this article encompasses the process
of evolution of aviation terrorism over the years, using the example of
El Al Israel Airlines as a target of an attack. The hypothesis is aviation
terrorism is a changing phenomenon, which has been accompanied
over the years by increasingly brutal methods of attacks, transforming
aviation terrorism from a medium of communication to a tool for
causing maximum damage. The transformation is not only a product of
changes in the ideological motivations of terrorists, but arises also from
advances in security systems in civil aviation, which continues to be an
attractive target of attacks.
To verify the hypothesis, the author will employ the genealogical
method to attempt to answer the research question is, how has the
phenomenon of aviation terrorism evolved over the years? To answer
the question, the author assessed 52 attacks against various
infrastructure elements in the years 1968 to 2012, from the first to the
last attack on El Al, as of October 19, 2021. Terrorists have chosen El Al
as the target of their attacks with full awareness and deliberation.
Furthermore, attacks on that airline set new trends in attacks, as
evidenced by the examples such as an aircraft hijack in 1968 and the
first ever attack in the landside area in 1970. Finally, throughout its
history El Al has faced key terrorist threats in civil aviation, such as
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Hijacking aircraft
Attempting to blow up an aircraft in flight
Engaging aircraft with man-portable air-defence systems
(MANPADS) and firearms during landing, taxiing, and
parking on the apron
Attacking passengers in an airport's landside area (terminal
and parking lot) with the use of firearms and grenades
Hostage-taking situations with passengers
Attacking airline personnel with the use of firearms
Planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
Attacking El Al in a cargo terminal
Simultaneously attacking the airline from different places,
and
Conducting suicide attacks.
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Materials and Methods
There is no single universal definition of aviation terrorism. Definitions
of terrorist acts may be aided by the list of acts of unlawful interference
contained in Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, which are defined as
acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation,
including
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

Unlawful seizure of aircraft
Destruction of aircraft in service
Hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes
Forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on
the premises of an aeronautical facility
Introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a
weapon or hazardous device or material intended for
criminal purposes
Use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death,
serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or
environment, and
Communication of false information such as to jeopardize
the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of
passengers, crew, ground personnel or the public, at an
airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.1

Every act of unlawful interference is not tantamount to a terrorist
incident. The important terms are the purposefulness and
unlawfulness.2
Before embarking on an analysis, one needs to differentiate a terrorist
operation from a terrorist attack. A terrorist operation is a planned
operation which includes the following elements:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Intention
Reconnaissance and selection of the target of the attack
(object)
Development of an action plan
Preparation of the attack
Execution of the attack
Exploitation of the benefits obtained during the attack.
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In this context, an attack is an element of a terrorist operation.
Characteristically, it is the most destructive stage of an operation and
the sum of the four elements that precede it. The relevance of
differentiating between an attack and operation is important for the
development of the safety philosophy and design of security systems,
particularly ones dedicated to countering terrorism.
Having analysed such sources as Global Terrorism Database, Terrorist
Incidents Against Jewish Communities and Israeli Citizens Abroad,
1968–2003, and Chronology of Aviation Terrorism: 1968-2004, the
author compiled a list of 52 terrorist attacks against El Al.3 The Table 1
contains dates of attacks; locations (in the case of aircraft hijacking, the
location of the attack is considered to be the place of departure, which
is supported by the research perspective of the security system, as it is
important to identify where the security failed); the object of the attack;
the name of the terrorist organisation; the method of the attack;
information on the victims and injured as well as killed and wounded
terrorists; information whether the attack was successful—an IED
attack is considered successful when it involves an explosion,
regardless of the number of victims, as this analysis does not include
deliberations on secondary targets of attacks. Table 1 on the following
page describes incidences of terrorist attacks on El Al Airlines from
1968 to 2012.
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Table 1. Terrorist Attacks on El Al Israel Airlines from 1968 to 2012
Date
Location
Object of
Attacker
Attack

7/22/1968

Method of
Attack

Victims /
Injured
Killed / Injured
Terrorists
0/0

Successful
Attack?

Rome–Tel Aviv
flight
Athens

Aeroplane

PFLP

Hijacking. IED

Aeroplane

PFLP

1/1

Yes

Aeroplane

PFLP

4/3

Yes

2/10/1970

Zurich.
Amsterdam–
Zurich–Tel Aviv
flight
Munich

Coach with
passengers

PFLP

1/11

Yes

4/15/1970

Istanbul

Office

0/0

Yes

06/09/1970

Tehran

Office

no data
available
PFLP

Automatic
weapons and
grenade launcher
fire during
aeroplane taxiing
Automatic
weapons fire
during aeroplane
take-off
Automatic
weapons fire and
grenades
IED
IED

n/a

Yes

12/16/1968

2/13/1969

Yes
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Date

Location

Object of
Attack

Attacker

Method of
Attack

09/06/1970

Amsterdam. Tel
Aviv–Amsterdam–
New York flight
London

Aeroplane

LFWP, FSLN

Office
Aeroplane

08/16/1972
10/13/1972

Rome. Destination
Rome–Tel Aviv
London
London.
Destination
London–Lydda
Rome–Tel Aviv
Paris

03/04/1973

New York

04/04/1973

Rome

Cargo
terminal
Aeroplane

10/06/1970
08/28/1971
09/01/1971
09/20/1971

Successful
Attack?

Hijacking. Small
arms and grenades

Victims /
Injured
Killed / Injured
Terrorists
0/0
1/0

no data
available
PFLP

IED

0/0

No

Air sabotage. IED

0/0

No

Aeroplane
Aeroplane

PFLP-GC
no data
available

Air sabotage. IED
Air sabotage. IED

0/0
0/0

No
No

Aeroplane
Office

PFLP-GC
no data
available
Black
September
PFLP

Air sabotage. IED
IED

0/4
0/0

Yes
No

IED

0/0

No

IED

0/0

No

No
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Date

Location

Object of
Attack

04/27/1973

Rome

Employee

09/05/1973

Rome

01/13/1975
01/19/1975

Paris
Paris

01/25/1976

Nairobi

08/11/1976

11/06/1976
05/20/1978

Attacker

Black
September
Aeroplane
Black
September
Aeroplane
PFLP
Passengers on PFLP
aerodrome

Istanbul

Aeroplane
during
parking
Office

PFLP and
Baader
Meinhof
PFLP

Istanbul
Paris

Office
Passengers

THKO
PFLP

Method of
Attack

Successful
Attack?

no data available

Victims /
Injured
Killed / Injured
Terrorists
1/0

MANPADS

0/0

No

MANPADS
Hostage taking.
Automatic
weapons and
grenades
MANPADS

0/3
0/20

Yes
Yes

0/0

No

Automatic
weapons fire and
grenades
IED
Automatic
weapons fire. IED

4/17

Yes

0/1
5/3

Yes
Yes

Yes
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Date

Location

Object of
Attack

Attacker

Method of
Attack

08/20/1978

London, a stop at a
hotel

Crew

PFLP

04/16/1979

Brussels

Black March

12/09/1979
01/02/1980

Rome
Istanbul

Aeroplane,
passengers
Aeroplane
Employee

02/18/1980
04/21/1980
01/19/1981

Rome
Zurich
Copenhagen

Office
Aeroplane
Office

05/15/1981
05/16/1981
08/09/1981
10/07/1981

Rome
Istanbul
Rome
Rome

Office
Office
Office
Office

ASALA
PLO
no data
available
15 May Org.
15 May Org.
15 May Org.
no data
available

Automatic
weapons fire and
grenades
Fire arms and
grenades
IED
Automatic
weapons fire
IED
Air sabotage, IED
no data available

NAR
MLSPB

IED
IED
IED
IED

Victims /
Injured
Killed / Injured
Terrorists
2/9

Successful
Attack?

0/12

Yes

0/3
1/0

Yes
Yes

0/1
0/0
0/1

Yes
No
Yes

0/0
0/0
0/2
0/1

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
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Date

Location

Object of
Attack

Attacker

Method of
Attack

01/09/1982

Istanbul

Office

03/28/1982
07/31/1982

Rome
Munich

11/12/1984

Vienna

Office
Passengers in
a terminal
Office

08/25/1985

Milan

Office

08/27/1985

Istanbul

Office

09/30/1985
12/27/1985

Amsterdam
Rome

Office
Passengers in
a terminal

no data
available
PLO
no data
available
no data
available
no data
available
no data
available
ANO, Fatah
ANO

12/27/1985

Vienna

Passengers in
a terminal

ANO

Successful
Attack?

IED

Victims /
Injured
Killed / Injured
Terrorists
0/0

IED
IED

0/0
0/7

Yes
Yes

IED

0/0

Yes

IED

no data available

Yes

IED

0/0

Yes

IED
Automatic
weapons fire and
grenades
Automatic
weapons fire and
grenades

0/0
16/81; 3/0

Yes
Yes

4/38; 1/2

Yes

Yes
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Date

Location

Object of
Attack

Attacker

Method of
Attack

04/17/1986

Aeroplane

No affinity

06/26/1986

London. New York–
London–Tel Aviv
flight
Madrid

12/07/1988

Copenhagen

05/21/1990

Istanbul

Passengers in
a terminal
Travel agency
office
Office

07/06/1990

London

Office

01/03/2001
07/04/2002

Zurich
Los Angeles

11/18/2002

Tel Avivi-Istanbul
flight
Burgas

Office
Passengers in
a terminal
Aeroplane

07/18/2012

Passengers in
a coach

Successful
Attack?

Air sabotage. IED

Victims /
Injured
Killed / Injured
Terrorists
0/0

Fatah

IED

0/13

Yes

Anti-Zionist
Autonomy
no data
available
no data
available
RP
No affinity

no data available

no data available

Yes

IED

no data available

Yes

IED

0/0

No

IED
Small arms fire,
knife attack
Hijacking. Attacker
armed with a knife
IED. Suicide attack

0/0
2/4; 1/0

Yes
Yes

0/0

No

6/30; 1/0

Yes

No affinity
Hezbollah

No
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Source: Author's adaptation from the Global Terrorism Database https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/; Michael Whine, “Terrorist
Incidents Against Jewish Communities and Israeli Citizens Abroad, 1968–2003,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism,
December 20, 2003, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/893/Terrorist-Incidents-against-Jewish-Communities-and-Israeli-CitizensAbroad-1968-2003#gsc.tab=0], Hillei Avihai, “Chronology of Aviation Terrorism: 1968–2004”
Acronyms:
ANO—Abu Nidal Organization
ASALA—Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
FSLN—Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front)
MLSPB—Marksist Leninist Silahlı Propaganda Birliği (Marxist Leninist Armed Propaganda Union)
NAR—New Armenian Resistance Group
PFLP-GC—Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PFLP—Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO—Palestine Liberation Organization
RP—Revolutionary Perspective
THKO—Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (People'SPeople’s Liberation Army of Turkey)

115
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss1/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.1.1945

Szymankiewicz: Evolution of Aviation Terrorism

Systematisation of the analysis of the perpetrators' modus operandi is
aided by information contained in Table 2 regarding frequencies with
which respective means of attack were used. The number of tools
totalled 59, for in certain cases the terrorists used multiple means of
attack.
Table 2. Frequency of Use of Respective Means of Attack
Tool of attack
Frequency of use
Improvised explosive device
33
Automatic weapons
11
Grenades
7
Small arms
2
Grenade launcher
1
Man-portable air-defence system
3
Knife
2
Source: Author's adaptation from the Global Terrorism Database,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

Historical Process of Evolution of Aviation Terrorism
Aviation terrorism has been dominated by attacks on two targets in
aviation infrastructure—aircraft and airports.4 In 1970-2018, there
were 1,358 terrorist incidents targeted against aviation, including 260
hijackings which accounted for the main method of attack.5 It is
considered that the first terrorist-like act took place in Peru in 1930,
when Peruvian revolutionaries hijacked an aeroplane to drop
propaganda leaflets. The first aircraft hijacking after World War II took
place in Macao in 1948. The practice was sporadic until 1966. In 1967,
15 aircraft hijackings were reported, and the number grew 30 in 1968.6
The growing incidence of civil aircraft hijackings triggered first
attempts to analyse and categorise hijackings by the criteria of their
nature and purpose. Four types of hijackings were distinguished:
1. Political escape, for example hijackings of aeroplanes in
socialist countries.
2. Mental illness—aeroplanes hijacked by mentally disturbed
individuals.
3. Sky banditry—desire for profit as the motive.
4. International terrorism—hijackings have a political context.7
Of the four types of aircraft hijackings listed above, only one—number
four—is considered as a manifestation of terrorism, which is supported
116
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by the political connotation of the perpetrators' motives. Type 1, the socalled political escape, is also politically motivated, but the escaping
hijacker has a personal motive only.
The beginnings of the contemporary aviation terrorism date back to
July 22, 1968, when three terrorists of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al aeroplane flying from
Rome to Tel Aviv.8 That hijacking had three attributes that
distinguished it from ones which had taken place before July 22, 1968,
setting a new trend in aviation terrorism, for example:
•
•

•

Change of course and destination was not the only purpose of
the hijacking;
The aeroplane was hijacked for political reasons; the
passengers and crew became hostages whom the terrorists
wanted to exchange for Palestinian prisoners;
The choice of the airline was conscious and deliberate—in
earlier hijackings, the carrier and aircraft had been chosen
solely on the grounds of destination, therefore the aircraft
served entirely to an end, for example escape. In the case of
El Al, the airline was both a secondary target—the terrorists'
intention to enter negotiations with Israel, exchange of the
hostages for prisoners, ransom, and the primary target—El Al
as a symbol of Israel.9

The strategy of the Palestinian terrorists gave aviation terrorism an
international character, which primarily attracted the attention of the
world's public to Palestinians. George Habash, one of the PFLP leaders,
substantiated the strategy in the following words: "When we hijack a
plane it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis in battle."10
In 1976, Zehdi Labib Terzi, the main PLO observer to the United
Nations, said: "The first several hijackings aroused the consciousness of
the world and awakened the media and the world opinion much more
effectively than twenty years of pleading at the United Nations."11 Such
a picture shows that aviation terrorism was initially limited to most
often to aircraft hijackings, and that the terrorists intended to draw the
attention of the world opinion to a specific problem, which somehow
made aviation terrorism a means of communicating information.
Presentation of the evolution of aircraft hijacking methods, including
chronology and categorisation by characteristic features, is aided by the
breakdown of the political threat proposed by John Harrison. It
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distinguishes three phases of the political threat in aviation terrorism in
the context of aircraft hijackings (see Table 3).12
Table 3. Three Phases of Political Threat
Phase Period
of Characteristic features
occurrence
I
1948–1968
Escape from political persecution.
II
1968–1994
Intention to negotiate—hijacking to
achieve a political objective, exchange
hostages, take ransom.
III
1994–now
Use of aircraft as a tool to cause the
maximum number of victims and
maximum damage.
Source: Author's adaptation based on J. Harrison, Aviation Security
Practice and Education: 1968 Onward [in:] A.R. Thomas (ed.),
Aviation Security Management, Vol. 1: The Context of Aviation
Security Management, London 2008, pp. 11-18.
Table 3 shows in a clear manner how aviation terrorism has evolved
over the years. The first phase was characterised by sporadic
unorganised escapes, most often from countries of the socialist bloc, in
which the hijacker treated the aircraft solely as a means of transport.
The hijackers of the second phase displayed membership in terrorist
organisations, most often ones that fought for independence and/or
pursued a left-wing agenda. Since the popularity of those organisations
was boosted greatly by the patronage of the Soviet Union, the fall of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was one on the main
reasons which contributed to the end of that phase and finally reduced
the appeal of the leftist ideology among terrorist organisations.
The third phase, as shown in the table above, started in 1994 and
continues to this day. However, the timeframe is only a matter of
convention and depends on arguments used. Among reasons behind
the start of the third phase of terrorism is the argument that the fall of
the USSR reduced the number of terrorist attacks carried out by leftwing and nationalistic organisations. On the other hand, the 1978-1979
Iranian Islamic revolution, during which its leader Ruhollah Khomeini
called for suicide attacks, greatly contributed to the change in the
methods of terrorist attacks and increase in the number of victims. The
ideology promoting suicide attacks was imported to Palestine by Fathi
Shaqaqi.13 As a result of the revolution, the motives behind terrorist
attacks shifted from political to religious. Convinced of their rights,
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religious fanatics began using aircraft as a tool to cause the maximum
number of victims and maximum damage. In the years that followed,
attacks on civil aviation became increasingly brutal, with the peak on
September 11, 2001, when, for the first time ever after, aircraft were
hijacked by suicide attackers and used as live bombs (the aeroplanes
involved were in service with American Airlines and United Airlines). It
can also be said that under the influence of the said revolution, aircraft
became not only a target but also a potential tool of attack.

Aviation Terrorism Targeting Ground Facilities of Civil
Aviation as Illustrated by the Example of El Al
The first terrorist attack to take place at an airport happened in Munich
in 1970 and targeted El Al passengers travelling by coach—three PFLP
fighters opened fire at the passengers, killing one and wounding 11.14
The latest attack took place in Bourgas, Bulgaria, on July 18, 2012—it
has also been the only suicide attack on passengers of the Israeli airline
to date.15 In accordance with the sources used to create the tables
contained in the work, in the last 50 years, there have been 33 attacks
on elements of ground infrastructure which targeted El Al—offices,
staff and cabin crew on the way or from the airport, passengers at the
airport, cargo terminal. Twenty of those attacks were on offices outside
airports; three attacks targeted personnel; nine attacks targeted
passengers at airports—including seven in a terminal and two on a
coach; and one attack was on a cargo terminal. In the attacks on offices,
IEDs were used on 17 occasions, while in three cases no information
was provided on the tool of attack. No person was killed in all the
attacks on offices, while five were wounded, although 17 attacks on
offices were considered as successful. From the perspective of the
security system, a successful attack with the use of an IED is considered
an attack that resulted in an explosion, regardless of the number of
casualties and the size of the damage. Passengers in an airport's
landside area (terminal and coaches in the parking lot) account for the
second most frequent target of attacks, and all such attacks were
considered successful. Fire arms were the preferred tool of attack, with
six such attacks reported, in which 28 people died and 157 were
wounded, and 5 terrorists were killed. On one occasion, an IED was
planted wounding 13 people. There was one suicide IED attack, in
which 6 people died and 30 were wounded, and one terrorist was
killed. In total, attacks on EL Al's ground infrastructure resulted in 38
victims, 217 wounded and six terrorists killed.
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Discussion
In the case of hijackings of El Al aircraft, which fell within the second
phase of the political threat, the only successful hijacking took place in
1968, which shows how quickly and effectively Israel responded to the
new type of threat. Since the last hijacking attempt took place in 2002,
it is unclear whether one can refer to the third phase of the political
threat in the case of El Al. However, considering the present
denomination of religiously-motivated terrorism and the popularity of
suicide attacks, El Al's security system is focused also on preventing the
most serious forms of attacks on board aircraft, such as explosion of an
IED planted on board, a suicide attack in flight and use of an aeroplane
as a live bomb. In this case, the simultaneous attack of September 11,
2001, represented the peak moment for civil aviation terrorism. After
that date, a number of security enhancements were introduced,
including linking passengers with hold baggage, enhanced security
checks and 100% baggage control, additional checks of cargo and mail,
installation of cockpit doors and the obligation to ensure uninterrupted
contact between aircraft and ground personnel.16 cannot rule out that
aircraft hijackings driven by the motives characteristic of the first and
second phases will take place, but they are highly unlikely due to the
difficulty of mounting such an attack today because of the increased
number of safeguards and security measures. One must also note the
shift in the target of attacks from aircraft to airport infrastructure, for
example attacks on the landside, which is a result of the ever more
enhanced security systems focused on aircraft with the crew and
passengers on board. Naturally, the holistic aspect of civil aviation
security rests on three pillars:
1. Protection of aircraft (including protection against attacks
from the outside and inside of the aircraft);
2. Protection of airports;
3. Protection of air traffic—encompassing protection of
facilities, personnel, and operational data, including
cybersecurity and protection of means of communications
vital to air traffic management.17
However, the philosophy of civil aviation security is dominated by the
concept of treating aircraft with the crew and passengers on board as
the core element of security—which results from the nature of the first
attacks, for example, the hijacking of the aircraft in flight with the crew
and passengers on board, and the fact that security systems are most
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often designed on a reactive basis. For this reason, one of the negative
effects of the evolution of aviation terrorism is the introduction of
further elements of security system that limit the freedom of
passengers. Another negative trend is the use of increasingly brutal
methods on the side of terrorists.
In case of attacks on ground elements of civil aviation infrastructure,
the landside area is particularly vulnerable.18 In 1980-2003, airports
accounted for one third of attacks on aviation elements.19 At present,
the greatest threat is attributed to IED attacks, with suicide IED attacks
in terminals and parking lot areas being particularly dangerous.20 As it
can be seen in Table 1, there are two distinct periods characterised by
different levels of brutality of the attacks. In 1970-1985, one could see a
low fatality rate, particularly in the case of IED attacks on offices. In
that period, the anti-Israel terrorism was dominated by nationalistic
and leftist organisations, which is in line with Rapaport's concept of the
third wave of terrorism.21 IED attacks on offices which brought no
killed or wounded show clearly that the terrorist organisations
intended to attract the public attention to their cause rather than to
deal the maximum damage—as this type of terrorism served primarily
as a method of negotiations and a means of communicating messages.
The period of increased brutality started on 27 December 1985 with
attacks in Rome and Vienna, in which a total of 20 people died and 109
were wounded, accounting for 43 percentage of all fatalities and 41
percentage of all wounded reported in all 52 attacks on El Al. A total of
seven member of the Abu Nidal Organization took part in the attacks,
of whom four were killed (57 percentage of all terrorists killed) and one
was wounded (50 percentage of all terrorists wounded). The two
simultaneous attacks marked the entry of aviation terrorism targeted
against El Al in the fourth wave of contemporary terrorism, which is
supported not only by an increased number of victims, but also the
terrorist mindset whereby the perpetrators were increasingly often
ready to die in the attack. That mindset was motivated by the departure
from the nationalistic ideology towards religiously-inspired terrorism,
as is illustrated by the Fatah attack on the passenger terminal in
Madrid in 1986, in which an IED explosion wounded 13 people. The
last element of the present evolution of aviation terrorism, as shown by
the example of El Al, was the first suicide attack in 2012 which came
with the third wave of jihadism.22
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The evolution of aviation terrorism involves also changes in potential
targets of attacks. Paradoxically, each successive attack could
contribute to improving civil aviation security and hindering similar
attacks in the future. This situation made, and still makes, terrorists
seek ever new methods, tools, and targets of their attacks. Also, the
expansion of the list of potential targets came as part of the ideological
transformations and shift from the political to religious motivation.
Politically-motivated terrorists, who wanted to attract the public
attention to their cause, perceived aircraft as the most attractive target,
whereas an attack in a passenger terminal would not be as effective, for
those types of attacks were intended to achieve intimidation and
publicity rather than cause deaths and damage. On the other hand,
religious fanatics—who have different motives (for example, maximum
deaths and damage) and do not have as easy access to aircraft as their
predecessors due to continuous security enhancements—are more
eager to attack targets other than the increasingly better protected
aircraft.
Aircraft with the crew and passengers on board is the core element of
the current philosophy of civil aviation security. Naturally, great
importance is attached to protection of every civil aviation element, as
due to the continuous technological development, changing
motivations and modus operandi only sky is the limit for potential
contemporary terrorists. Furthermore, an airport is a part of critical
infrastructure, although it must be noted that most critical
infrastructure elements are located in operational or restricted zones,
which makes them better protected. Indeed, with its general
accessibility, the landside zone is the easiest area to attack due to
difficulties in ensuring the appropriate level of protection, which
effectively can be achieved mainly by surveillance and monitoring.23
Despite the shift in the attitude to designing security systems from
reactive to proactive, towards anticipation of potential threats, the risk
of attack cannot be eliminated completely. The picture of the evolution
of aviation terrorism in terms of targets of attacks is not limited only to
the transition from politically-motivated to religiously-motivated
terrorism. At present, no motive can be ruled out, although the
religious motivation is prevalent. Considering the easy accessibility of
the landside zone, where there are many people, it is an attractive
target for terrorist who want to cause many victims, which is part of the
concept of postmodern terrorism.24
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Conclusions
The example of terrorism against the El Al lines gives us a historical
overview of almost all methods of attacks against civil aviation,
considering changes in the ideological motivation of terrorists and the
attack methods used. In summary, one can see a clear process of
evolution of aviation terrorism over the years which is characterised by
changes in methods and motivations of terrorists. The shift from
politically-motivated terrorism to religious motivations is particularly
notable. At its beginning, aviation terrorism was associated with
aircraft hijackings where the only threat was the threat of violence by
the hijacker or hijackers who used the aircraft to escape. Subsequently,
hijackings involved threats of violence issued by people who had
sufficient means to destroy the aeroplane or kill the passengers and
crew, and who treated hijackings as a means of communicating
information and attracting public attention. It its third phase, aviation
terrorism is accompanied by the intention to cause maximum damage,
which underlines the departure of terrorism from being a means of
communication towards being a tool of combat. A similar trend can be
seen in the case of attacks on ground aviation facilities, where the shift
in terms of targets does not result only from ideological changes, but
also from the level of protection which makes terrorists seek more
accessible targets of their attacks.
The advent of religiously-motivated terrorism made aircraft a tool for
causing maximum victims and damage, which is confirmed by the
increasing brutality of attacks raised by the author in the hypothesis.
Furthermore, changes in aviation terrorism—both on the side of
terrorists and civil aviation safety and security agencies—entailed a
shift in potential targets of attacks from hardly accessible aircraft to
virtually any element of civil aviation infrastructure, where the landside
zone is most vulnerable due to its attractiveness and ease of attack.
However, this does not mean that aircraft are no longer potential
targets—in this case, IED sabotage in flight or attempts to use aircraft
as live bombs represent the most dangerous methods of attack. It
would be optimistic and unrealistic to say that the evolution of aviation
terrorism discussed in this article is over. The process is far from
complete, and its future shape cannot be predicted precisely.
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